crls as last parameter to avoid warning 16 (4.12 compatibility) (#144 by @hannesm)~subject to allow changing the subject when signing a signing request (#139 by @reynir)~sloppy from Private_key.decode_{pem,der}. The seemingly bad RSA keys were valid and should have been accepted by mirage-crypto. (#142 by @psafont)~sloppy option to recover from bad keys (where e.g. the private exponent d is wrong). (#135 by @hannesm, reported by @mattjbray in mirage/mirage-crypto#62)(unit, signature_error) result and logs (Logs.warn) if a weak (non-SHA2) hash algorithm was used. This function is used for verifying signatures on certificates, signing requests, and certificate revocation lists.`CAInvalidSelfSignature constructor (Validation.ca_error) and `ChainInvalidSignature constructor (Validation.chain_validation_error) have been removed.Validation.chain_error is now flat (the tags `Chain and `Leaf have been removed)Wildcard|Strict] * [`host] Domain_name.t (Certificate.Host_set.t) reported by @mmaker in #88, fixed in #127RSA|ECDSA] * Nocrypto.Hash.hash) option requested by @psafont in #123, fixed in #128revert General_name.t (DNS and IP components) to string/Cstruct.t list
fingerprint : t -> hash -> Cstruct.t, the hash of the certificate (@cfcs, #66)Authenticator.chain_of_trust are not validated (to contain KeyUsage / BasicConstraint extensions) anymore, users can use valid_ca and valid_cas to filter CAs upfrontOk of certificate option | Fail of certificate_failureOk of certificate | Fail of certificate_failure ], where [certificate] is the trust anchor